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Unscrambling the Organic Eggs 
THE GROWING DIVERGENCE BETWEEN THE DOJ AND 
THE FTC IN MERGER REVIEW AFTER WHOLE FOODS  
INTRODUCTION 
When the merger between Whole Foods Market Inc. 
(“Whole Foods”) and Wild Oats Markets, Inc. (“Wild Oats”) was 
first announced in 2007, few people suspected that this $565 
million merger would set off such a massive (organic) food 
fight, forcing the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and the judiciary to re-evaluate 
their roles in the merger process.1 On March 6, 2009, Whole 
Foods and the FTC announced a settlement.2 The tortuous legal 
battle between the FTC and Whole Foods might be over, but 
the most important result of the battle is not the settlement 
between the FTC and Whole Foods. Rather, it is the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ controversial decision in FTC v. 
Whole Foods Market, Inc., which articulated a preliminary 
injunction standard making it much easier for the FTC to block 
future mergers, compared to its antitrust enforcement 
counterpart at the DOJ.3 In a system of shared responsibility 
for enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, such an outcome 
is unacceptable. Merging parties should expect the same 
treatment and burden in the merger review process. The 
substantive outcome of a proposed merger should not depend 
on the arbitrary allocation of the merger to either the FTC or 
the DOJ for review. However, after Whole Foods, the outcome 
of a proposed transaction might very well depend on which 
antitrust enforcement agency is reviewing it. 
  
 1 See Andrew Martin, Whole Foods Makes Offer for a Smaller Rival, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at C1. The deal was a tender offer for all of Wild Oats stock at a 
price of $18.50 per share—a 23% premium over the average share price in January of 
2007. Id.  
 2 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Consent Order Settles Charges 
that Whole Foods’ Acquisition of Rival Wild Oats was Anticompetitive (March 6, 2009), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/03/wholefoods.shtm.  
 3 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008), amended and reissued, 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008). 
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In Whole Foods, the FTC sought a preliminary 
injunction to stop the proposed merger of two organic 
supermarkets, Whole Foods and Wild Oats.4 The FTC argued 
that Whole Foods and Wild Oats were the two largest 
competitors in the “premium, natural, and organic 
supermarkets” or “PNOS” market and a merger of the two 
companies would harm consumers by reducing competition in a 
number of geographic markets.5 The D.C. District Court 
rejected the FTC’s argument that PNOS were a distinct market 
and concluded that a merger of Whole Foods and Wild Oats 
would not substantially lessen competition in the broad market 
of all supermarkets.6 Nearly a full year after the closing of the 
merger and the integration of the two firms,7 a panel of D.C. 
Circuit judges (Judge Brown, Judge Tatel, and Judge 
Kavanaugh) issued three separate opinions reversing the 
denial of the preliminary injunction.8 In Whole Foods, the D.C. 
Circuit explicitly articulated a standard that significantly 
reduces the FTC’s burden of proof in its request for preliminary 
injunctions. This lowered preliminary injunction standard, and 
the ability of the FTC to commence administrative proceedings, 
create a disturbing perception that the outcome of a challenged 
merger depends on which agency is reviewing the merger, 
rather than on the antitrust merits of the case. 
The effect of the Whole Foods decision has already been 
felt. Less than a week after Whole Foods and the FTC settled, a 
$1.4 billion merger between CCC Holdings, Inc., (“CCC 
Holdings”) and Mitchell International, Inc., (“Mitchell 
International”) was abandoned after a judge relied on Whole 
  
 4 Preliminary injunctions are used by the antitrust enforcement agencies to 
“preserve the status quo by preventing the consummation of a merger.” AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MERGER AND ACQUISITIONS: 
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES 546 (3d. ed. 2008) [hereinafter 
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES]. Normally, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief 
must prove: (1) irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, (2) this injury 
outweighs any harm to the defendant by the injunction, (3) the plaintiff has a 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, and (4) the injunction is in the public 
interest. Id. at 564-65. For a more in depth discussion for each of the different factors, 
see id. at 570-95.  
 5 Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1032. 
 6 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 49-50 (D.D.C. 2007), 
rev’d., 533 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 7 See Alicia Wallace, Boulder’s Whole Foods-Wild Oats: One Year Later, 
BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Aug. 25, 2008, at D1. There were significant changes in 
personnel, suppliers, distribution systems, and leasing agreements. Id.  
 8 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt, Inc., 533 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008), reprinted as 
amended, 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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Foods to issue a preliminary injunction that stopped the 
proposed transaction.9 In November 2008, the three-judge 
panel had amended and reissued its original opinions in Whole 
Foods, so that Judge Tatel no longer concurred in Judge 
Brown’s opinion, but rather only with the judgment of the 
court.10 As a result of Judge Tatel’s revision, Judge Brown’s 
opinion was no longer the majority opinion of the court and 
there were questions about the precedential value of the 
decision.11 However, FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc. made it clear 
that Whole Foods and its articulation of the preliminary 
injunction standard for the FTC was now binding precedent.12  
In a system where the DOJ and the FTC have shared 
responsibility for enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, 
merging parties should expect comparable treatment and 
burden, as well as a comparable outcome, regardless of 
whether the FTC or the DOJ is reviewing their merger.13 
Antitrust enforcement has an enormous impact on the 
economy, so consistency, predictability, and fairness are crucial 
in the merger review process. However, the settlement between 
the FTC and Whole Foods after a prolonged and expensive 
fight, and the termination of the proposed merger between 
CCC Holdings and Mitchell International, provide disturbing 
illustrations that the choice of enforcement agency for merger 
review clearly does influence the outcome of a transaction. In 
light of Whole Foods, the best outcome for parties to a proposed 
merger would be for the DOJ to clear the proposed transaction. 
This Note will address the growing divergence in 
merger enforcement between the FTC and the DOJ. It argues 
  
 9 See FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2009). On 
March 9, 2009, Judge Collyer granted the FTC’s request for a preliminary injunction. 
On March 11, 2009, the parties announced the termination of the merger. See Press 
Release, CCC Information Services Inc., CCC-Mitchell mutually agree to terminate 
merger (March 11, 2009), available at http://ccc.cccis.com/filebin/pdf/CCCMITCHELL 
Nonpursuit.pdf. 
 10 Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1028. 
 11 See id. at 1061 n.8 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). According to Judge 
Kavanaugh, “this confused decision will invite years of uncertainty and litigation over 
what the holding of this case is-a separate but important problem with the Court’s 
approach.” Id.  
 12 See FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d at 36. According to Judge 
Collyer, “precedents irrefutably teach that in this context ‘likelihood of success on the 
merits’ has a less substantial meaning than in other preliminary injunction cases. 
Heinz not only emphasized this point but Whole Foods makes clear that Heinz remains 
good law.” Id. at 36 n.11.  
 13 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
129 (2007), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc 
_final_report.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT].  
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that the FTC’s lower preliminary injunction standard and its 
ability to commence administrative litigation gives the FTC a 
significant advantage over the DOJ in challenging a merger 
and extracting a settlement, a result that is unacceptable in a 
dual enforcement system. Specifically, the Note argues that 
after Whole Foods, the ultimate decision as to whether a 
merger may proceed depends on which agency is reviewing the 
transaction, which can lead to both expensive litigation and 
disruptive post-closing divestitures. Part I examines the 
relevant antitrust statutes, the enforcement agencies involved, 
and how the merger review process works. Part II reviews the 
history of the FTC’s challenge to the merger between Whole 
Foods and Wild Oats. It begins with a discussion of the merger, 
followed by a discussion of the district court and the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decisions. It concludes with a review 
of the settlement between the FTC and Whole Foods. Part III 
discusses how the divergence in preliminary injunction 
standards applicable to the DOJ and the FTC, and the ability 
of the FTC to pursue administrative trials, produce 
inconsistent results between the FTC and the DOJ in merger 
enforcement. This Part argues that due to these divergences, 
the choice of which antitrust enforcement agency is to review a 
proposed merger is outcome-determinative.14 Finally, Part IV 
suggests two approaches to harmonizing the divergences: a 
judicial solution and a legislative solution. It argues that in 
light of CCC Holdings, Inc., a judicial solution is unlikely, so 
the most politically promising solution to stem the growing 
divergence between the DOJ and the FTC enforcement 
standards is for Congress to amend the Federal Trade 
Commission Act to specify that the same preliminary 
injunction standard applies to both enforcement agencies.  
  
 14 See American Bar Association, Public Comments Submitted to AMC 
Regarding Government Enforcement Institutions: Differential Merger Enforcement 
Standards, at 9 (Oct. 28, 2005), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/ 
public_studies_fr28902/enforcement_pdf/051028_ABA_Fed_Enforc_Inst_Differential_S
tandards.pdf [hereinafter ABA Comments re Differential Standards].  
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I. THE PROCESS OF MERGER REVIEW BY THE DOJ AND THE 
FTC 
The DOJ’s Antitrust Division and the FTC have shared 
responsibility for enforcement of the federal antitrust laws.15 To 
avoid duplication of effort, the agencies consult with one 
another and a proposed transaction is “cleared” to one agency 
or the other for review in a process known as the “clearance 
process.”16 This Part examines how the dual enforcement 
system functions. It begins with a discussion of the relevant 
federal antitrust statutes. It then discusses the clearance 
process between the FTC and the DOJ, the decision to 
challenge a proposed transaction in court or in an 
administrative trial (for the FTC), and the potential remedies 
available to the enforcement agencies, such as divestitures, for 
a merger with anticompetitive concerns.  
A. Overview of the Applicable Antitrust Statutes 
At the federal level, the framework for the merger 
review process is contained in a few relevant statutes, namely 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act, and Section 5 of the FTC Act.17 Modern antitrust law really 
began with the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890.18 Section 
1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, combinations, or 
conspiracies in restraint of trade.19 Section 2 prohibits 
monopolies and attempts at monopolies.20 The Sherman Act 
only prohibits restraints of trade that are unreasonable.21 To 
build upon the protection afforded in the Sherman Act, 
  
 15 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 129; Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, Guide to the Antitrust Laws, the Enforcers, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/enforcers.shtm.  
 16 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, Guide to the Antitrust Laws, 
Mergers: Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, http://www.ftc.gov/ 
bc/antitrust/premerger_notification.shtm.  
 17 Of course, every state and the District of Columbia have its own statutes 
regulating the competitive effects of mergers and acquisitions. See Stephen Calkins, 
Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 53 DUKE L.J. 673, 678 (2003). 
However, this note will only focus on the federal statutes.  
 18 See Scott A. Sher, Closed But Not Forgotten: Government Review of 
Consummated Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 41, 
45 (2004) (tracking the development of modern antitrust law and analyzing numerous 
cases involving closed merger challenges by the FTC and DOJ). 
 19 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 20 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 21 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, Guide to the Antitrust Laws, 
the Antitrust Laws, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/antitrust_laws.shtm.  
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Congress passed the Clayton Act in 1914,22 amended it in 1950 
with the Celler-Kefauver amendments to close some loopholes,23 
and amended it again in 1976 with the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976 (“HSR Act”).24  
1. The Clayton Act 
Today, the principal federal antitrust statute is the 
Clayton Act, specifically Section 7, which prohibits mergers or 
acquisitions “in any line of commerce or in any activity 
affecting commerce in any section of the country, [when] the 
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen 
competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”25 Even though the 
Clayton Act was much more expansive than the Sherman Act, 
the lack of a requirement for pre-closing notifications meant 
that the government could challenge an anticompetitive 
transaction only after it closed.26 By then, it was often too late 
to enforce the Clayton Act.27 Aware of the substantial costs and 
time involved in such post-consummation challenges, Congress 
enacted the HSR Act with the goal of “giving the government 
antitrust agencies a fair and reasonable opportunity to detect 
and investigate large mergers of questionable legality before 
they are consummated.”28 The HSR Act and the establishment 
of the premerger notification program would give the antitrust 
enforcement agencies such an opportunity.  
2. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act  
The HSR Act is often credited with establishing the 
modern merger review process by giving the DOJ and the FTC 
  
 22 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).  
 23 Celler-Kefauver Amendments, Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (Codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006)). After the Celler-Kefauver amendments, Section 7 
of the Clayton Act covers both asset acquisitions and stock acquisitions. See Brown 
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 316 (1962). In Brown Shoe, the Supreme Court 
reviewed the legislative history and purpose of the amendments. See id. at 315-23.  
 24 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 
90 Stat. 1383 (Current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006)). 
 25 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). 
 26 See Sher, supra note 18, at 52-53. 
 27 Litigation often took years and even if the government won, there was 
often no remedy because the firms were already well integrated. Id. at 52-54. 
 28 H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 5 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 
2637. 
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the ability to block mergers before consummation.29 Before the 
passage of the HSR Act, it was very difficult to challenge a 
merger successfully.30 Without advance notice of the 
transaction, mergers were typically challenged after they were 
already consummated.31 The government also had very little 
time to prepare, and carried the burden of proof for obtaining a 
preliminary injunction.32 Since these challenges often took 
years to litigate, it was very difficult for courts to come up with 
an appropriate remedy to restore competition—“that is, to 
unscramble the eggs”—because it was very difficult to recreate 
the acquired entity as an independent “competitively viable 
firm.”33 So even when the government was successful in its 
challenge, it was often a hollow victory and too late to gain any 
“meaningful relief.”34  
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act changed all of this by 
requiring the parties to notify the FTC and the DOJ about 
mergers and acquisitions of certain sizes before they occur, and 
to give the antitrust agencies time to review such transactions 
before consummating the proposed transaction.35 Under the 
HSR Act, the parties to certain proposed transactions must 
notify both the FTC and the DOJ by submitting a “Notification 
and Report Form” with some information about the parties and 
  
 29 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 47, 151; Sher, 
supra note 18, at 52-54.  
 30 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2637, 2640; see also Sher, supra note 18, at 52-54 (discussing the difficulties of post-
consummation challenges).  
 31 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 47; Sher, supra 
note 18, at 52-53. 
 32 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2637, 2640 (“[W]ithout advance notice of an impending merger, data relevant to its 
legality, and at least several weeks to prepare a case, the government often has no 
meaningful chance to carry its burden of proof, and win a preliminary injunction 
against a merger that appears to violate section 7. The weight of this burden cannot be 
overemphasized.”).  
 33 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 47. “Unscrambling 
the eggs” is a term used to express the difficulty of a divesture remedy when a merger 
is already closed and the assets of the combined firms are integrated. H.R. REP. No. 94-
1373, at 4-5 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 2640-41 (After closing, “the 
acquired firm’s assets, technology, marketing systems, and trademarks are replaced, 
transferred, sold off, or combined with those of the acquiring firm. Similarly, its 
personnel and management are shifted, restrained, or simply discharged. In these 
ways, the acquiring and acquired firms are, in effect, irreversibly ‘scrambled’ 
together.”).  
 34 H.R. REP. No. 94-1373, at 8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2637, 
2640. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 151. 
 35 See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2006); see also Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of 
Competition, Guide to the Antitrust Laws, Mergers: Premerger Notification and the 
Merger Review Process, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/premerger_notification.shtm.  
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the proposed transaction.36 The HSR Act does not require a 
premerger filing for all mergers or acquisitions.37 The filing 
thresholds are updated annually, but generally, the parties 
must be of a certain size and the deal must be of a certain 
value.38 Under the HSR Act, advance notice must be provided to 
both the DOJ and the FTC even though only one agency will 
review the proposed merger.39 The HSR Act also enables the 
agencies to obtain documents and other necessary information 
from the parties and third parties to assess whether to 
challenge the proposed transaction.40 Congress’s solution to the 
time constraint problem was to establish a thirty-day waiting 
period.41 During this time, the parties are prohibited from 
closing their deal unless the waiting period is granted early 
termination by the FTC or the DOJ.42 As a result of the HSR 
Act, challenges to consummated deal are relatively rare 
because the agencies are able to challenge mergers before they 
are consummated.43 Nevertheless, over the last decade, the FTC 
has been much more aggressive in challenging closed deals 
where the anticompetitive concerns were not apparent during 
the merger review process.44 
  
 36 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, Hart-Scott-Rodino Premerger 
Notification Program Introductory Guide I, What is the Premerger Notification 
Program? An Overview, at 6, (2008) available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/introguides/ 
guide1.pdf [hereinafter Guide I]. Copies of the form and instructions are available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/hsrforms.htm.  
 37 In addition to the size of the parties or of the deal, there are a limited 
number of exceptions to the HSR Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c) (2006) (exempting certain 
transactions from HSR Act’s requirements). 
 38 See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Premerger Introductory Guide II, To File or Not to File—When you must file a 
premerger notification report form, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/introguides/ 
guide2.pdf. Guide II describes the criteria used to determine whether a transaction is 
subject to the requirements of the HSR Act.  
 39 Guide I, supra note 36, at 11.  
 40 Id. at 12.  
 41 See id. at 9. In the case of an all cash tender offer or an acquisition in 
bankruptcy, there is a fifteen-day waiting period. Id.  
 42 Id. at 9. 
 43 Sher, supra note 18, at 41.  
 44 See id. at 42 (describing how since 2001, the FTC has challenged 
consummated mergers involving MSC Software, Chicago Bridge, Airgas, and Aspen 
Technology, as well as seriously investigated dozens more); see also ABA Comments re 
Differential Standards, supra note 14, at app. a 2-7 (list of mergers and acquisitions 
the FTC has challenged post-closing); D. Bruce Hoffman & M. Sean Royall, 
Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Past, Present, and Future, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 
319, 319-20 (2003) (“The FTC today is aggressively continuing to use the 
administrative litigation process in the manner envisioned by the agency’s creators . . . 
the FTC’s administrative litigation process has become the forum in which many of our 
day’s most complex and interesting antitrust issues are being litigated.”). 
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3. The Federal Trade Commission Act 
The FTC is an administrative agency created by 
Congress in 1914 under the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(“FTC Act”).45 Only the FTC can bring cases under the FTC 
Act.46 The FTC was formed to police “unfair methods of 
competition”47 and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.”48 Congress created the FTC to supplement 
the DOJ’s enforcement of the antitrust laws, and to help 
develop and clarify antitrust policy by giving the FTC 
adjudicative power under Section 5(b) of the FTC Act.49 As a 
result, the FTC can challenge a transaction in federal courts as 
well as through an internal administrative proceeding (known 
as a Part III proceeding) before an administrative law judge.50 
Whether it wins or loses at the federal court level, the FTC can 
still challenge a transaction through administrative litigation. 
This allows the FTC to initiate an administrative proceeding to 
challenge a transaction pre-consummation or post-consummation.51  
B. Overview of the Merger Review Process 
Although the DOJ’s Antitrust Division and the FTC 
have shared responsibility for enforcement of the federal 
antitrust laws, in practice, only one agency is responsible for 
  
 45 See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, 
Guide to the Antitrust Laws, The Antitrust Laws, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/ 
antitrust_laws.shtm.  
 46 See id. Unlike the DOJ, the FTC does not have criminal enforcement 
authority. 
 47 The term “unfair methods of competition” is generally thought to mean the 
same as the prohibitions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION 
REPORT, supra note 13, at 129. 
 48 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006) (“The Commission is hereby empowered and 
directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair 
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”).  
 49 Hoffman & Royall, supra note 44, at 319-20. See American Bar Association, 
Section of Antitrust Law, Public Comments Submitted to AMC Regarding Dual 
Federal Merger Enforcement, at 2 (Oct. 28, 2005) (“[T]he FTC was designed to function 
as an expert body in antitrust law, capable of assessing and adjudicating the 
competitive effects of complex transactions”) [hereinafter ABA Comments re Dual 
Enforcement]; Fed. Trade Comm’n, Guide to the Federal Trade Commission, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/general/gen03.shtm (“Congress created the 
FTC as a source of expertise and information on the economy.”). 
 50 The FTC may seek a preliminary permanent injunction in federal court 
under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006). It can commence an administrative proceeding under 
15 U.S.C. § 45(b)-(c) (2006). 
 51 See generally Hoffman & Royall, supra note 44.  
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investigating a particular merger. As the law enforcement 
agency of the executive branch, the DOJ is entrusted with the 
power to bring criminal antitrust cases or civil actions seeking 
an injunction and to take steps to remedy past violations.52 As 
an administrative agency, the FTC is allowed to seek a 
preliminary or permanent injunction in federal court or 
commence an internal administrative proceeding.53 Despite 
criticism that this dual enforcement arrangement was 
unnecessarily duplicative, it has worked relatively well with 
few conflicts between the two agencies.54 One of the reasons for 
the lack of clashes is that over the years, the two agencies have 
developed a “clearance process” where the FTC and the DOJ 
will consult with each other, and the matter is “cleared” to one 
agency for review.55  
1. The Clearance Process 
To avoid duplication of enforcement efforts, the DOJ 
and the FTC will consult with each other to decide which 
agency will conduct a formal investigation of a particular 
transaction. During the waiting period, the FTC and the DOJ 
will assign the filing to a specific division or section within the 
agency having expertise over the industry of the proposed 
transaction.56 Initially, both agencies will perform a preliminary 
review of the proposed transaction.57 If the assigned division or 
section within one agency determines that a formal 
investigation is necessary, that agency will seek clearance from 
the other agency to conduct an investigation.58 Since only one 
agency will be conducting the investigation of the proposed 
  
 52 Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Mission of the Antitrust Division, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/mission.htm. 
 53 See supra note 50.  
 54 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 129. According 
to the Antitrust Modernization Report, “[c]ritics contend that having two agencies 
enforce the federal antitrust laws entails unnecessary duplication and can result in 
inconsistent antitrust policies, additional burdens on businesses, or other obstacles to 
efficient and fair federal antitrust enforcement.” Id.  
 55 Id. at 132-33; Guide I, supra note 36, at 11.  
 56 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE MERGER 
REVIEW PROCESS: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO FEDERAL MERGER REVIEW 26 (3d. ed. 
2006) [hereinafter MERGER REVIEW GUIDE]. 
 57 Guide I, supra note 36, at 11.  
 58 MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 26-27, 134-36. At the DOJ, the 
Office of Operations will ask the Premerger Office at the FTC for clearance to 
investigate. At the FTC, the Premerger Office will notify the Office of Operations at the 
DOJ to coordinate which agency will conduct the investigation. Id. at 27. 
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transaction, neither agency will contact the parties or third 
parties until it has been decided which agency will be 
responsible for investigating the proposed transaction.59 This 
minimizes the potential for confusion and duplication of efforts 
if both agencies contacted the parties at different times for the 
same matter.60  
This clearance process determines which agency will 
conduct the investigation; this is usually the agency with the 
most relevant staff expertise and experience in the industry 
potentially affected by the proposed merger.61 For example, the 
FTC is responsible for industries where consumer spending is 
high, such as health care, pharmaceuticals, food, energy, 
computer technology, and internet services.62 If there are 
disputes over which agency has more expertise in a given area, 
the matter is passed to increasingly senior staff until it is 
resolved, potentially all the way up to the Chairman of the FTC 
and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust at the DOJ.63 
As a result of the clearance process, only one agency takes 
control of the investigation.  
  
 59 Guide I, supra note 36, at 11; MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 
136. However, any interested person, including the parties to the proposed transaction, 
is free to present information to either or both agencies at any time. Guide I, supra 
note 36, at 11. 
 60 See Guide I, supra note 36, at 11. 
 61 See MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 27. In 2002, the DOJ and 
the FTC reached an accord to explicitly allocate certain industries to each agency. See 
Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div. & Federal Trade Comm’n, Memorandum of Agreement 
Between the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the United 
States Department of Justice Concerning Clearance Procedures for Investigations 
(Mar. 5, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/10170.pdf. However, the 
accord was short-lived and ended after objections from Senator Ernest F. Hollings. As a 
result, the two agencies have continued to decide based on staff expertise and 
experience. See Lauren Kearney Peay, The Cautionary Tale of the Failed 2002 
FTC/DOJ Merger Clearance Accord, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1308-10 (2007) (discussing 
the failure of the 2002 accord and potential approaches to improving the interaction 
between the FTC, the DOJ, and Congress).  
 62 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Competition, An FTC Guide to the Antitrust 
Laws: The Enforcers, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/enforcers.shtm. However, if one 
agency decides not to initiate an investigation, even in an industry where it has quite an 
amount of expertise in, the other agency is free to start an investigation. See MERGER 
REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 135.  
 63 See ABA Comments re Dual Enforcement, supra note 49, at 11 & n.16; 
MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 135. Although not common, these disputes 
between the agencies may cause significant delays in the merger review process. Id. at 
136.  
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2. Further Investigation Required: Second Request 
Once clearance is granted, the investigating agency will 
notify the merging parties that an investigation has been 
opened. The investigating agency can now obtain information 
from various sources, including the merging parties.64 After the 
initial investigation, the agency can decide to do three things: it 
can grant early termination of the waiting period, allow the 
waiting period to expire, or it can issue a Request for 
Additional Information (a “second request”).65 The second 
request is commonly used to allow the staff more time to 
investigate,66 and will often require the parties to provide more 
information about the transaction and its potential 
anticompetitive effects.67 After the parties have substantially 
complied with the second request for information, there is an 
additional thirty-day waiting period, after which the agency 
must decide whether to approve the merger, seek a preliminary 
injunction in federal court to stop the merger, or seek a 
voluntary agreement not to close the deal until further 
investigation can be completed.68 During this time, the parties 
can meet with review officials to argue that their transaction 
should not be challenged.69 The investigating agency can also 
grant an early termination of the waiting period, or allow it to 
expire if they decline to pursue a challenge.70 Either way, the 
parties are free to close their transaction at that point.  
3. Agency Action: Approve or Litigate 
At the DOJ, the staff’s recommendation is first reviewed 
by the appropriate section chiefs and increasingly senior 
officials before it goes to the ultimate decision maker, the 
  
 64 See Guide I, supra note 36, at 12. 
 65 See MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 138.  
 66 See id. at 27-29. The extended waiting period is normally thirty days from 
the date of substantial compliance by both merging parties. It is ten days for “a cash 
tender offer or certain bankruptcy filings.” Guide I, supra note 36, at 13. 
 67 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 151; see also Guide 
I, supra note 36, at 12. 
 68 MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 29; see also 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(2) 
(2006). Parties are often willing to extend the time period voluntarily because it gives 
them more time to prepare and to meet with reviewing officials to persuade them not to 
challenge the transaction. MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 247-50.  
 69 MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 29. 
 70 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(2) (2006); see also Guide I, supra note 36, at 10.  
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Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust.71 At the FTC, the 
staff recommendation is forwarded to the appropriate deputy 
directors and directors before it goes to the final decision 
makers, the five commissioners.72 If the merger is approved, or 
if thirty days has passed since the parties substantially 
complied with the second request, the parties are free to 
consummate their transaction.73 If the investigating agency 
determines that a merger may substantially lessen 
competition, the agency can try to reach a settlement, or it can 
seek a preliminary and permanent injunction in the 
appropriate district court to enjoin the consummation of the 
merger.74 
In practice, the agencies will usually try to negotiate 
with the merging parties to reach a settlement, either through 
a consent decree where the parties agree to a divestiture of 
certain assets to ease concerns about the merger’s 
anticompetitive effects, or through a less common “fix-it-first” 
restructuring of their transaction.75 Depending on the 
circumstances, parties can either abandon the transaction,76 or 
agree to settle as a way to avoid costly and time-intensive 
litigation that could delay the closing of the transaction and the 
ensuing efficiencies of the merger.77  
C. Proceeding to Litigation: Challenging a Proposed 
Transaction 
1. Seeking Injunctive Relief in Federal Court 
If the merging parties and the enforcement agency fail 
to negotiate a settlement, the FTC and the DOJ are authorized 
  
 71 MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 29. For a more in depth 
discussion of the process and the decision makers that are involved, see id. at 232-36, 
242-47. 
 72 Id. at 29-30. Parties are given the opportunity to present their case at each 
step of the approval process. This includes meeting with each commissioner separately. 
A majority vote of the commissioners is necessary for any action. For a more in depth 
discussion of the process and the decision makers that are involved, see id. at 232-42. 
 73 Guide I, supra note 36, at 13.  
 74 MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 30-31, 254.  
 75 See id. at 252-53; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION 
POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 1 (2004) [hereinafter DOJ MERGER REMEDIES 
GUIDE], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf; see also 
Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: 
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 181 (2008).  
 76 See MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 256-57. 
 77 See id. at 255. 
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to seek injunctive relief in federal court to enjoin a transaction 
that they believe raises competitive concerns.78 The DOJ and 
the FTC have different approaches when seeking injunctive 
relief. Unlike the FTC, the DOJ does not have another avenue 
for permanent relief other than the federal court process. As a 
result, the DOJ often asks for both a preliminary injunction 
and a permanent injunction from the district courts.79 If the 
DOJ’s request is denied, the parties can usually consummate 
their merger without further concerns of antitrust litigation.80 
In contrast, the FTC only seeks a preliminary injunction; if the 
FTC loses, the parties still have to worry about the FTC 
potentially pursuing costly and lengthy administrative 
litigation.81 
Due to the need to close a proposed transaction quickly 
(to enjoy the efficiencies that come from a merger and to avoid 
the costs of litigation), preliminary injunctions are particularly 
important to both the parties and the enforcement agencies.82 If 
the district court denies the injunction, the agencies normally 
treat the denial as final and will not take any further action.83 
As a result, the parties can close the merger relatively quickly.84 
However, if a court grants the injunction, the parties will most 
likely abandon the transaction because very few firms can 
withstand the time, costs, and uncertainty involved in an 
appeal or an administrative trial.85 
  
 78 The DOJ is authorized to seek an injunction under 15 U.S.C. § 25 (2006). 
The FTC is authorized to seek an injunction under 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006). 
 79 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 138. 
 80 The ABA Section of Antitrust Law has not been able to find any example of 
the DOJ seeking a permanent injunction after failing to obtain a preliminary 
injunction. ABA Comments re Differential Standards, supra note 14, at 5. 
 81 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 139.  
 82 See MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 255 (“In many cases, the 
preliminary injunction motion will determine the outcome of the case.”).  
 83 UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 4, at 546 (“An 
unsuccessful effort to obtain a preliminary injunction can be the plaintiff’s final battle 
to block a merger. . . .”).  
 84 See MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 255; UNDERSTANDING THE 
ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 4, at 546-47. This is assuming the Court of Appeals fails 
to grant a stay pending appeal by the enforcement agency or the FTC decides not to 
pursue an administrative proceeding. See infra Part I.C.2.  
 85 UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 4, at 547. ANTITRUST 
MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 139.  
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2. The FTC Pursuing Administrative Litigation 
If the DOJ fails to obtain an injunction, it will abandon 
any further litigation.86 However, the FTC has pursued 
administrative proceedings after losing at the preliminary 
injunction stage.87 The decision by the FTC to pursue an 
administrative proceeding is made on a case-by-case basis with 
the standard being whether the “pursuit of administrative 
litigation after the denial of a preliminary injunction motion 
would serve the public interest.”88 Some of the criteria the FTC 
uses in its decision include “the district court’s factual findings 
and conclusions of law; any new evidence developed during the 
preliminary injunction proceeding; whether the transaction 
raises important issues of fact, law, or merger injunction policy 
that need resolution in administrative litigation; the costs and 
benefits of further proceedings; and any additional relevant 
factor.”89 An administrative proceeding takes place before an 
FTC administrative law judge, with review by the five 
commissioners.90 The decision can then be appealed to a federal 
appellate court.91 
3. Relief: Structural Remedies and Conduct Remedies 
Merger concerns can be resolved through negotiation, 
resulting in a settlement, or through litigation in court. The 
FTC has stated that its remedial objective is to “prevent the 
anticompetitive effects likely to result from a merger that the 
[FTC] has determined is unlawful.”92 Similarly, according to the 
DOJ, “[a]lthough the remedy should always be sufficient to 
redress the antitrust violation, the purpose of a remedy is not 
to enhance premerger competition but to restore it.”93 Coming 
up with an appropriate remedy can be extremely difficult. In 
  
 86 MERGER REVIEW GUIDE, supra note 56, at 255.  
 87 Id. 
 88 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Closes Its Investigation of Arch 
Coal’s Acquisition of Triton Coal Company’s North Rochelle Mine (June 13, 2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/06/ 
archcoal.htm.  
 89 Id. 
 90 Hoffman & Royall, supra note 44, at 322.  
 91 Id.  
 92 Federal Trade Comm’n, Negotiating Merger Remedies, Statement of the 
Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, at 4 (April 2, 2003), available 
at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/bestpractices/bestpractices030401.pdf.  
 93 DOJ MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 75, at 4. 
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fashioning a remedy, the speed, certainty, cost, efficacy, and 
ease of monitoring are all important factors that need to be 
taken into consideration.94  
Merger remedies usually take two basic forms.95 The 
first form, a structural remedy, usually involves a divestiture 
or the sale of assets by the merged firms.96 The second form, a 
conduct remedy, is usually an injunctive provision that 
regulates or changes the business conduct of the merged firm.97 
Structural remedies are preferred because they require very 
little ongoing monitoring by the enforcement agency.98 In 
contrast, conduct remedies are not preferred because of the 
monitoring costs involved, and the fact that consumers would 
ultimately be harmed if the restrained firm fails to survive in a 
competitive market.99 A remedy can be a combination of 
structural and injunctive remedies.  
Divestiture is the primary post-consummation remedy 
for a Section 7 violation (or Section 5 of the FTC Act) because 
the logical solution to excessive concentration is divesture of 
the assets that caused the antitrust problems.100 Since the goal 
of divestiture is to restore competition, the agencies try to 
ensure that the divestiture remedy contains enough assets for 
the purchaser to function as a long-term viable competitor, 
with the hope of replacing the competition prior to the 
merger.101  
II. FTC V. WHOLE FOODS MARKET, INC. 
The tortuous legal battle between the FTC and Whole 
Foods might be over, but the D.C. Circuit’s controversial 
decision in Whole Foods continues to give the FTC a significant 
advantage over the DOJ in challenging a merger and 
extracting a settlement. This Part examines the D.C. Circuit 
  
 94 Id. at 7-8.  
 95 Id. at 7. 
 96 Id.  
 97 Id.  
 98 Id. “Structural remedies are preferred to conduct remedies in merger cases 
because they are relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly government 
entanglement in the market.” Id. This is in contrast to conduct remedies, which are 
often “more difficult to craft, more cumbersome and costly to administer, and easier 
than a structural remedy to circumvent.” Id. at 8. 
 99 Id. at 8-9. 
 100 See UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 4, at 603; see also 
DOJ MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 75, at 7-8. 
 101 DOJ MERGER REMEDIES GUIDE, supra note 75, at 9-11. 
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Court’s fractured opinion. It begins with a discussion of the 
merger between Whole Foods and Wild Oats, and the FTC’s 
decision to challenge the merger. It then reviews the district 
court and the D.C. Circuit’s opinions, and concludes with a 
review of the settlement between the FTC and Whole Foods. 
A. Background: The Merger Between Whole Foods and Wild 
Oats 
At the time of the merger, Whole Foods and Wild Oats, 
respectively, were the largest and second largest nationwide 
operators of organic supermarkets in the United States.102 
Whole Foods operated approximately 194 stores,103 and Wild 
Oats operated approximately 110 stores.104 Whole Foods is a 
Texas corporation that opened its first store in 1980.105 Wild 
Oats is a Delaware corporation that opened its first store in 
1987.106 Both chains have expanded over the years by opening 
new stores and acquiring other premium natural and organic 
supermarkets.107 Both Whole Foods and Wild Oats tried to 
differentiate themselves from other supermarkets by focusing 
on natural and organic products, as well as a commitment to 
quality and service.108 In February 2007, Whole Foods 
announced its intent to purchase Wild Oats for an estimated 
$565 million.109 The market reacted positively after the 
announcement as investors and analysts generally applauded 
the merger as necessary in the face of intense competition from 
  
 102 Martin, supra note 1. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id.  
 105 Whole Foods Market Home Page, About Whole Foods Market, 
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/company/index.php (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
 106 Whole Foods Market Home Page, Company History, http://www.whole 
foodsmarket.com/company/history.php#18 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).  
 107 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 2007), 
rev’d, 533 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Whole Foods acknowledges on its website that 
“[m]uch of the growth of [the] company has been accomplished through mergers and 
acquisitions. The story of Whole Foods is incomplete without honoring these notable 
companies in their own right.” Whole Foods Market Home Page, Company History, 
http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/company/history.php#18 (last visited Feb. 27, 2010). 
 108 Proof Brief for Appellant FTC at 5-6, FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 
F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-5276). 
 109 Martin, supra note 1. The deal was a tender offer for all of Wild Oats stock 
at a price of $18.50 per share—a 23% premium over the average share price in January 
of 2007. Proof Brief for Appellant FTC, supra note 108, at 6.  
952 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:3 
larger rivals like Wal-Mart, Safeway, Kroger, and Trader 
Joe’s.110  
In February 2007, Whole Foods filed the Premerger 
Notification and Report Forms with the FTC and DOJ as 
required by the HSR Act.111 The merger caught the FTC’s 
attention.112 After going through the clearance process, the FTC 
was chosen as the investigating agency due to its traditional 
expertise in the supermarkets industry.113 After reviewing the 
documents from the second request, the FTC authorized its 
staff to seek a preliminary injunction under Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act and Section 5 of the FTC Act.114 In June 2007, the 
FTC filed a complaint in the District of Columbia seeking a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin the merger.115 All five 
commissioners voted in favor of bringing the case.116  
In its complaint, the FTC argued that a merger of the 
two biggest chains in the premium natural and organic 
supermarkets, or PNOS, market would “substantially lessen 
competition and thereby cause significant harm to consumers” 
by increasing prices and reducing quality and services.117 In 
defining the relevant markets, the FTC found that premium 
natural and organic supermarkets are different from 
  
 110 Martin, supra note 1. One commentator described the merger as 
“consistent with how Whole Foods has created value for shareholders for much of its 
history. . . .” Id. The chief executive of Wild Oats, Gregory Mays, said he considered the 
merger a “perfect marriage” and a “natural fit” because of the intense competition from 
much larger rivals who were eager to move into this lucrative and growing market. Id. 
In fact, Mr. Mays stated that since “the two stores were the leaders in the natural and 
organic marketplace . . . it [was] a ‘perfect marriage’ because the combined company 
could focus on larger rivals.” Id.  
 111 See supra Part I.A.2.  
 112 See Proof Brief for Appellant FTC, supra note 108, at 6. 
 113 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, AN FTC GUIDE TO THE ENFORCERS: THE FEDERAL 
GOV’T, STATES AND PRIVATE PARTIES (2008), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/antitrust/factsheets/ 
FactSheet_FedEnforcers.pdf.  
 114 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks to Block Whole Foods 
Market’s Acquisition of Wild Oats Markets (June 5, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/ 
2007/06/wholefoods.shtm. 
 115 Id; Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary 
Injunction Pursuant to Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act at 2, 5-6, 
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt. Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 07-cv-01021) 
[hereinafter FTC Complaint]. 
 116 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 114.  
 117 FTC Complaint, supra note 115, at 1. See Andrew Martin, F.T.C. to Sue in 
Bid to Halt Food Merger, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 6, 2007, at C1 (Jeffrey Schmidt, the director 
of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, said in a statement that “Whole Foods and Wild 
Oats are each other’s closest competitors in premium natural and organic 
supermarkets, and are engaged in intense head-to-head competition in markets across 
the country. If Whole Foods is allowed to devour Wild Oats, it will mean higher prices, 
reduced quality and fewer choices for consumers.”).  
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conventional retail supermarkets because PNOS offer a unique 
upscale shopping experience for their customer that is 
characterized by a large selection of organic foods and excellent 
customer service.118 The FTC alleged that the customer base for 
PNOS is different from that of traditional supermarkets 
because PNOS customers seek an experience where the 
shopping environment can matter as much as the price.119 The 
FTC also alleged that Whole Foods and Wild Oats were each 
other’s closest competitors in twenty one geographic markets 
and that the merger would create monopolies in eighteen 
cities.120  
Needless to say, the parties involved as well as analysts 
who follow the companies and industry were surprised by the 
FTC’s decision.121 Analysts and reporters were quick to point 
out that the combined entity would only operate about 300 
supermarkets.122 By comparison, Wal-Mart, the largest 
supermarket chain in the U.S., owns about 3,000 stores that 
sell groceries, and Kroger, the second-largest supermarket 
chain in the U.S., owns about 2,500 grocery stores.123 Due to the 
need to close the merger quickly, the lawsuit at the district 
court level was litigated on a very fast track so as to allow the 
losing side sufficient time to appeal the decision before the 
consummation of the proposed deal, which was scheduled for 
August 31, 2007.124  
  
 118 FTC Complaint, supra note 115, at 10. 
 119 See id. at 8-9. 
 120 Id. at 11-12. 
 121 See Martin, supra note 117. One “somewhat bemused” research analyst 
remarked that the FTC’s decision was “‘somewhat at odds’ with the recent blurring of 
lines between stores like Whole Foods and Trader Joe’s and more conventional chains 
like Publix and Wegmans” and the fact that “74 percent of natural and organic foods 
were now sold through mass-market channels like conventional supermarkets.” Id. 
Whole Foods’ Chief Executive John Mackey said in a statement that “[t]he FTC has 
failed to recognize the robust competition in the supermarket industry, which has 
grown more intense as competitors increase their offerings of natural, organic and 
fresh products; renovate their stores; and open stores with new banners and formats 
resembling Whole Foods Market.” Id.  
 122 David Kesmodel & John R. Wilke, Why Whole Foods Deal Is in Peril—
Pending FTC Challenge To Wild Oats Deal Argues Firms Are in Narrow Arena, WALL 
ST. J., Jun. 6, 2007, at A3. Whole Foods and Wild Oats together only accounted for 15% 
of the $46 billion natural-foods market. Id.  
 123 Id.  
 124 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2007), rev’d, 
533 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The merger was consummated on August 28, 2007.  
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B. The District Court’s Opinion in FTC v. Whole Foods 
Market, Inc. 
In a thorough opinion, Judge Friedman denied the 
FTC’s request for a preliminary injunction because he 
concluded the FTC had not demonstrated a likelihood of 
success on the merits—that is, that the effects of the merger 
“may substantially lessen competition [or] tend to create a 
monopoly” in a properly defined relevant product market.125 As 
with most antitrust cases, the product market definition was 
key.126 After going over the arguments on both sides, Judge 
Friedman found that the “economic evidence, market research 
studies, and evidence concerning the realities on the ground . . . 
all lead to the conclusion that the relevant product market in 
this case is not [PNOS] as argued by the FTC but . . . at least 
all supermarkets.”127 Judge Friedman also noted that so-called 
conventional supermarkets like Wal-Mart, Kroger, and 
Safeway were all carrying natural and organic foods.128 In fact, 
market research indicated that a majority of natural and 
organic goods are now being sold in conventional supermarkets 
as they move aggressively into the sale of organic foods.129 With 
such stiff competition from more conventional supermarkets, 
Judge Friedman believed that post-merger, customers would 
still have plenty of competing options to choose from.130 As a 
result, Judge Friedman concluded that there was no 
substantial likelihood that the FTC would be able to prove its 
asserted product market, or that the Whole Foods-Wild Oats 
merger would “substantially lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly.”131  
Following the district court’s decision, the FTC filed an 
emergency motion for an injunction pending the outcome of the 
appeal, which was unanimously denied by a three-judge panel 
of the D.C. Circuit Court.132 At that point, four federal judges 
had looked at the case and all concluded that the FTC had 
failed to meet the preliminary injunction standard. Shortly 
  
 125 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 53(b) (2006)).  
 126 FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1073 (D.D.C. 1997). 
 127 Whole Foods, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 34. 
 128 Id. at 26-27. 
 129 Id. at 27. 
 130 Id. at 36. 
 131 Id. at 49-50. 
 132 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 
amended and reissued, 592 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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thereafter, the parties closed the merger.133 After closing, Whole 
Foods started integrating Wild Oats by converting certain 
stores and selling other stores under the Wild Oats family.134  
C. The D.C. Circuit’s Opinions in FTC v. Whole Foods 
Market, Inc. 
In July 2008, almost a full year after the merger was 
consummated, a panel of the D.C. Circuit reversed and 
remanded the district court’s decision to deny the FTC’s motion 
for a preliminary injunction in a splintered decision with no 
majority opinion.135 The decision was amended and reissued in 
November 2008.136 Judge Brown, Judge Tatel, and Judge 
Kavanaugh each wrote a separate opinion in the July and 
November rulings.137 In the July ruling, Judge Brown wrote the 
opinion for the court. Judge Tatel wrote a concurring opinion, 
and Judge Kavanaugh wrote a dissenting opinion.138 According 
to Judge Brown, the district court committed legal error by 
rejecting the FTC’s market definition so that it failed to give 
adequate weight to the FTC’s evidence.139 The majority thus 
held that the FTC had raised enough questions about the 
merits of its case against the merger.140 Following the decision, 
Whole Foods petitioned the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing en 
banc. The petition for rehearing en banc was denied on 
November 21, 2008.141 However, on that same day, the three-
judge panel amended and reissued its original opinions.142 The 
most significant difference between the July and November 
rulings was that Judge Tatel no longer concurred in Judge 
Brown’s opinion but only in the judgment of the court.143 Judge 
Brown and Judge Tatel continued to agree, however, that the 
  
 133 Proof Brief for Appellant FTC, supra note 108, at 4 n.3. 
 134 Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1033 (“Whole Foods has already closed some Wild 
Oats stores and sold others. In addition, Whole Foods has sold two complete lines of 
stores, Sun Harvest and Harvey’s, as well as some unspecified distribution facilities.”).  
 135 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 533 F.3d 869, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 136 Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1028. 
 137 Id. 
 138 See id.  
 139 Id. at 873. 
 140 Id. at 882. 
 141 Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1028. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
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district court’s decision should be reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings.144 
Judge Brown believed that the district court used the 
correct standard for granting a preliminary injunction, but 
incorrectly applied the standard in its analysis of the product 
market.145 According to Judge Brown, in deciding whether to 
grant an injunction, “a district court must balance the 
likelihood of the FTC’s success against the equities, under a 
sliding scale.”146 However, this balancing test will often weigh in 
favor of the FTC because “the public interest in effective 
enforcement of the antitrust laws’ was Congress’s specific 
‘public equity consideration’ in enacting the provision.”147 Thus, 
the FTC will usually be able to obtain a preliminary injunction 
by “rais[ing] questions going to the merits so serious, 
substantial, difficult[,] and doubtful as to make them fair 
ground for thorough investigation.”148 
According to Judge Brown, the district court did not 
appropriately apply the standard because it incorrectly found 
that the FTC failed to present evidence of a likelihood of 
success and therefore never weighed the equities.149 The district 
court erred when it assumed that “marginal customers,”150 and 
not “core customers,”151 must be the focus of an antitrust 
analysis.152 Instead, Judge Brown stated that core consumers 
should be given consideration as a separate submarket in 
certain cases, such as when there is a distinct service or a 
specialized or “unique environment.”153 Judge Brown believed 
that the FTC’s evidence demonstrated that there was a distinct 
PNOS submarket of core customers who shop exclusively at 
Whole Foods or Wild Oats for their unique environment.154 As a 
result, the district court had underestimated the FTC’s 
  
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 1034-36. 
 146 Id. at 1035. 
 147 Id. (quoting FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
 148 Id. (quoting Heinz, 246 F.3d at 714-15).  
 149 Id. at 1035-36. 
 150 A marginal consumer is someone who would switch to a competitor if his 
primary choice imposed a small but significant and nontransitory price increase 
(typically 5%). See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2007), 
rev’d, 533 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
 151 Core customers are the customers who refuse to switch despite a price 
increase. Id. at 16-17.  
 152 Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1037. 
 153 Id. at 1037-39. 
 154 Id. at 1039-40. 
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likelihood of success on the merits.155 Since the district court did 
not reach the equities in its decision, Judge Brown and Judge 
Tatel both agreed to remand the case back to the district court 
to determine whether policy considerations weighed against 
the injunction.156  
After the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the FTC made it clear 
that it wanted to commence an in-house administrative trial on 
the merger, scheduled to begin in April of 2009.157 Thus, the 
FTC had two cases on parallel tracks: one in the district court 
(Whole Foods), and the other in an internal administrative 
proceeding. On January 29, 2009, the FTC announced that it 
would temporarily halt its review of the merger so that the 
FTC and Whole Foods could engage in settlement talks.158 On 
March 6, 2009, almost 21 months after the FTC first sued 
Whole Foods in federal court to stop the deal, Whole Foods and 
the FTC announced a settlement.159  
D. The Settlement Between the FTC and Whole Foods 
The consent agreement between Whole Foods and the 
FTC required Whole Foods to divest thirty-two Wild Oats 
stores and assets related to those stores in seventeen separate 
geographic markets.160 However, out of the thirty-two stores, 
only thirteen stores were operating at the time of the 
agreement.161 Whole Foods had closed the other nineteen stores, 
but still retained control over them.162 Whole Foods was also 
required to divest Wild Oats intellectual property, including 
the rights to the Wild Oats brand.163 The FTC believed that 
“[e]ven months after the acquisition, the Wild Oats brand name 
  
 155 Id. at 1041. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See Brent Kendall, FTC is Planning Hearings on Whole Foods Merger, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2008, at B8.  
 158 Commission Order Withdrawing Matter From Adjudication, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, In the Matter of Whole Foods Market, Inc., and Wild Oats Markets, Inc., No. 
9324 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9324/090128orderwithdrawingmatter.pdf. 
 159 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 2. 
 160 Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders To Aid Public Comment 
at 3, In the Matter of Whole Foods Market, Inc., and Wild Oats Markets, Inc., No. 9324 
(2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9324/090306wfanal.pdf [hereinafter Analysis of 
Agreement].  
 161 Id. at 3. These are referred to as live stores. Id. at 3 n.4.  
 162 Id. at 3. These are referred to as dark stores. Id. at 3 n.4. 
 163 Decision and Order at 2, In the Matter of Whole Foods Market, Inc., and 
Wild Oats Markets, Inc., No. 9324 (2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9324/ 
090306wfdo.pdf [hereinafter Decision and Order]. 
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retains significant brand equity that has been developed over 
the past 20 years.”164 While the stores may be divested to more 
than one FTC-approved buyer, the Wild Oats intellectual 
property may be divested to only a single FTC-approved 
buyer.165 The consent agreement appointed a divestiture trustee 
to oversee the marketing and sale of the assets.166 The consent 
agreement also includes an order to maintain assets, which 
requires Whole Foods to continue to operate the stores in a way 
that preserves marketability and competitiveness until a FTC-
approved buyer is found.167 In the end, the divestitures will only 
“offer relief in 17 of the 29 geographic markets alleged in the 
amended administrative complaint.”168 
III. THE CHOICE OF THE ENFORCEMENT AGENCY IS 
OUTCOME-DETERMINATIVE AFTER WHOLE FOODS 
Due to the statutory authority granted to the FTC in the 
FTC Act, there are important procedural differences between 
the FTC and the DOJ. First, as seen in Whole Foods, the FTC 
enjoys a lower standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction 
than the DOJ.169 Second, the FTC’s statutory authority to 
commence administrative litigation, even after a denial of a 
request for a preliminary injunction, creates uncertainty about 
the proposed transaction—a risk not faced if the DOJ is 
challenging the merger.170 The divergence between the two 
agencies is most troubling when the FTC decides to pursue an 
administrative trial post-consummation, as seen in its battle 
with Whole Foods. With the status of their merger in legal 
limbo (and already well integrated), the parties are forced to 
defend their merger in a long and costly administrative 
proceeding, a risk they do not face if the DOJ is challenging it. 
This Part argues that the substantive outcome of a merger 
challenge depends on which agency is challenging it; that is, 
the choice of enforcement agency is outcome-determinative.171 
The preliminary injunction standard for the FTC as articulated 
in Whole Foods puts the debate on whether the choice of 
  
 164 Analysis of Agreement, supra note 160, at 3. 
 165 Decision and Order, supra note 163, at 4.  
 166 Id. at 3. The FTC appointed The Food Partners as the divestiture trustee. 
 167 Analysis of Agreement, supra note 160, at 4.  
 168 Id. at 3.  
 169 See infra Part III.A.  
 170 See supra Part I.C.2.  
 171 See ABA Comments re Differential Standards, supra note 14, at 9. 
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enforcement agency is outcome-determinative to rest with an 
empathetic “yes” in the D.C. Circuit. 
A. The Divergence in Preliminary Injunction Standards for 
the DOJ and the FTC  
The most significant aspect of the Whole Foods decision 
is not the substance of the decision, but rather the preliminary 
injunction standard for the FTC. There has been an ongoing 
debate about whether the FTC faces a preliminary injunction 
burden that is lower than that of the DOJ.172 In its report, the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission stated that “[t]here is at 
least a perception, if not a reality, that the FTC and the DOJ 
face different standards” and the standard for the FTC is “less 
burdensome, or is generally perceived to be less burdensome, 
than the standard applicable to DOJ actions” for obtaining a 
preliminary injunction.173 After Judge Brown’s opinion in Whole 
Foods, the perception that the FTC faces a lower preliminary 
injunction standard is no longer just perception, it is a fact.  
Traditionally, a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must 
prove: (1) irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, (2) 
the injury outweighs any harm to the defendant by the 
  
 172 See Report of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar Association 
to the Antitrust Modernization Commission at 10 (2004), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ 
amc/comments/abaantitrustsec.pdf (“DOJ has to meet the regular district court 
standards when seeking preliminary injunctive relief . . . subjecting itself to a full 
hearing on the merits and a higher standard of proof. In contrast, the FTC typically 
seeks only preliminary injunctive relief from the district court and does so under a 
standard that, as written, appears to be less demanding than that facing other litigants 
(including the DOJ), reserving trial on the merits for agency adjudication. Most 
transactions are abandoned if an injunction under any standard is granted. Thus, some 
lawyers believe that the apparently lower burden for the FTC could lead to different 
outcomes.”). But see Hearing on Federal Civil Remedies for Antitrust Offenses: 
Statement of Commissioner Thomas B. Leary Before the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission at 5 (2005), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/051201civilremedies.pdf 
(“The ABA submission points out, first, that some decisions seem to apply a more 
lenient standard when the FTC applies for a preliminary injunction than they do when 
the DOJ applies. It is not possible to know whether the facially different standards 
have been outcome-determinative; I personally doubt that they have been in recent 
years, and suspect our litigators would agree.”); Observations on Federal Antitrust 
Enforcement Institutions: Comments of W. Blumenthal to the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission at 6 (2005), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/11/051103gcstmntonfedantitrust 
enforcement.pdf (“Because the preliminary injunction standards applied to actions 
brought by the FTC and DOJ appear to be substantially identical, any differences in 
their application would seem more likely to be based upon the specific facts of a given 
matter than substantive legal standards. So far as I am aware there is no evidence that 
any cases or group of cases were or would have been decided differently based on which 
of the antitrust agencies was the plaintiff.”).  
 173 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 141-42. 
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injunction, (3) the plaintiff has a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits, and (4) the injunction is in the public 
interest.174 Due to its status as an administrative agency, the 
FTC is subjected to a different preliminary injunction standard 
than the DOJ. The DOJ is subjected to the traditional test 
articulated above,175 while the FTC is subjected to the standard 
set forth in Section 13(b) of the FTC Act.176 Under Section 13(b) 
of the FTC Act, the FTC can obtain an injunction “[u]pon a 
proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the 
Commission’s likelihood of ultimate success, such action would 
be in the public interest.”177 Courts have read Congress’s intent 
in Section 13(b) as making injunctive relief “broadly available 
to the FTC”178 and the appropriate test to be a “public interest” 
test—that is, “the court evaluates whether it is in the public 
interest to enjoin the proposed merger.”179  
At the preliminary injunction stage, the FTC is not 
required to prove that the proposed merger would in fact 
violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act.180 Instead, the FTC is only 
required to show that it is likely to succeed in showing under 
Section 7 that the proposed merger “may be substantially to 
lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly.”181 In Whole 
Foods, Judge Brown made it clear that the FTC will usually be 
able to obtain a preliminary injunction blocking a merger by 
“rais[ing] questions going to the merits so serious, substantial, 
  
 174 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIV., ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL IV-15 
(4th ed. 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/ 
atrdivman.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL]; UNDERSTANDING THE 
ANTITRUST ISSUES, supra note 4, at 564. 
 175 ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 174 (“The Federal Rules do not 
prescribe a standard for granting or denying a PI. Traditional equitable considerations 
apply.”).  
 176 See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006); see also United States v. Gillette Co., 828 F. 
Supp. 78, 80 (D.D.C. 1993) (comparing the preliminary injunction standards for the 
DOJ and FTC). 
 177 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2006); see FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 714 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (“Congress intended this standard to depart from what it regarded as the 
then-traditional equity standard.”).  
 178 FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“Congress 
further demonstrated its concern that injunctive relief be broadly available to the FTC 
by incorporating a unique ‘public interest’ standard in 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), rather than 
the more stringent, traditional ‘equity’ standard for injunctive relief.”).  
 179 H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 713.  
 180 E.g., id. at 714; FTC v. Libbey, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 34, 44 (D.D.C. 2002) 
(“Congress used the words may be substantially to lessen competition . . . to indicate 
that its concern was with probabilities, not certainties.” (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962))).  
 181 H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 714; Libbey, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 44; FTC v. Staples, 
Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1071 (D.D.C. 1997). 
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difficult[,] and doubtful as to make them fair ground for 
thorough investigation.”182 Despite “at best, poorly explained 
evidence” on the FTC’s part,183 the FTC’s statutory authority to 
engage in adjudicative administrative proceedings means that 
it can create a presumption in favor of an injunction just by 
raising serious and doubtful questions about the merits of the 
case.184 In other words, the FTC is entitled to an injunction 
unless the FTC has “entirely failed to show a likelihood of 
success.”185 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kavanaugh argued 
that Judge Brown and Judge Tatel’s dilution of the preliminary 
injunction standard amounted to allowing “the FTC to just 
snap its fingers and temporarily block a merger.”186 After Whole 
Foods, the question is no longer how much the FTC must show 
in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, but rather how 
little the FTC can show in order to obtain such an injunction. 
Furthermore, Judge Brown stated that it “is not to say 
market definition will always be crucial to the FTC’s likelihood 
of success on the merits. Nor does the FTC necessarily need to 
settle on a market definition at this preliminary stage.”187 
Basically, Judge Brown believes that while the FTC must 
define a relevant market to prevail on the merits, it does not 
need to do so to at the preliminary injunction stage.188 Judge 
Brown believes that the FTC can satisfy its burden of proof by 
simply showing that it has a chance of defining a market, even 
if it initially defines the market incorrectly. Under this 
standard, the FTC will be able to obtain a preliminary 
injunction just by speculating that a merger may reduce 
competition. Parties seeking to merge would be at a severe 
disadvantage when responding to the FTC’s requests because 
the FTC can put forth ambiguous market definitions and argue 
that it will prove the correct market definition in a later 
administrative proceeding. Since the FTC does not have to 
define the market correctly at the preliminary injunction stage, 
  
 182 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing 
H.J. Heinz, 246 F.3d at 714-15).  
 183 Id. at 1032. 
 184 Id. at 1035. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. at 1052 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 187 Id. at 1036. 
 188 See id. at 1036-37. (“[T]he FTC may have alternate theories of the merger’s 
anticompetitive harm, depending on inconsistent market definitions . . . . One may 
have such doubts without knowing exactly what arguments will eventually prevail. 
Therefore, a district court’s assessment of the FTC’s chances will not depend, in every 
case, on a threshold matter of market definition.”).  
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this deference to the FTC allows the FTC to challenge 
previously marginal cases, resulting in a greater number of 
merger challenges.189 Going forward, this lowered preliminary 
injunction standard makes it far easier for the FTC to block 
mergers in the D.C. Circuit.  
B. The Whole Foods Preliminary Injunction Standard 
Combined with the FTC’s Ability to Pursue 
Administrative Litigation Is Outcome-Determinative 
After Whole Foods, it is difficult to see how the FTC 
would not win at the district court level, especially when it is 
entitled to a presumption of injunctive relief unless it has 
“entirely failed to show a likelihood of success.”190 Even if the 
district court somehow denies the preliminary injunction, the 
FTC can still use the threat of an administrative proceeding to 
force the parties to settle or to terminate the transaction. The 
FTC’s ability to prolong a merger challenge with an 
administrative trial puts enormous pressure on merging 
parties to either settle or terminate the transaction, even 
though the transaction had closed. As seen in Whole Foods, the 
choice of the FTC as the investigating agency played a big role 
in the outcome of the case and subsequent settlement. These 
divergences between the DOJ and the FTC subject merging 
parties to different legal obligations, and impose costs and 
inefficiencies on parties that may be passed on to consumers. 
1. The FTC Has More Leverage in the Settlement 
Context 
The FTC’s ability to pursue administrative litigation 
gives it a significant advantage that the DOJ lacks in 
negotiating a settlement, as few parties will want to litigate a 
full administrative trial and face the risk of expensive and 
disruptive divestitures.191 Unlike the FTC, the DOJ enjoys no 
presumption in favor of preliminary injunctive relief.192 To avoid 
duplication of efforts, the DOJ usually agrees with the merging 
parties to consolidate the hearings for preliminary and 
  
 189 See infra Part III.B.2. 
 190 Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1035. 
 191 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 142.  
 192 See Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1035. Unlike the FTC, the DOJ is still 
subject to the traditional equity test for a preliminary injunction. See supra Part 
III.A.1.  
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permanent injunctions.193 If the DOJ fails to obtain a 
preliminary injunction, and barring an appeal, the parties are 
free to consummate their transaction.194 In contrast, the FTC’s 
ability to commence administrative litigation imposes a 
different timeframe and uncertainties on the merging parties, 
giving the FTC greater leverage in negotiating a consent 
agreement with the parties than the DOJ.195 In its Antitrust 
Modernization Report, the Antirust Modernization Commission 
recognized that the “mere availability” of a potential 
administrative trial “can harm parties by creating uncertainty 
as to the legal status of their transaction, a risk not faced when 
the DOJ brings a challenge to a merger.”196 The threat of 
administrative litigation imposes delays, uncertainties, and 
costs on parties whose merger is reviewed by the FTC, a risk 
they do not face if the merger was reviewed by the DOJ.197 
Rather than risking lengthy and expensive litigation, parties to 
a proposed transaction will be more likely to either settle or 
terminate the transaction if the FTC is adamant about 
challenging the transaction.198  
The divergences between the two agencies are 
particularly acute when the FTC decides to pursue an 
administrative trial post-consummation. The leverage the FTC 
has over merging parties is even more apparent in the 
consummated merger context, where the parties have little 
choice but to either litigate the administrative trial or settle. 
By then, the assets are all “scrambled” and the combined entity 
is already well integrated. Since the parties are already well 
integrated, the parties will be forced to either settle from a 
disadvantaged bargaining position or defend their merger in a 
long and costly administrative proceeding, a risk they do not 
face if the DOJ was challenging the merger. Thus, there is 
  
 193 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 139. 
 194 Id. According to the American Bar Association’s Section of Antitrust Law, 
“[a]lthough the DOJ has the option of seeking permanent relief in federal court after 
failing to obtain a [preliminary injunction], we have not been able to find any examples 
of the DOJ having done so.” ABA Comments re Differential Standards, supra note 14, 
at 5. 
 195 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 140-42.  
 196 Id. at 139. 
 197 See id. 
 198 See Frankel, supra note 75, at 182 (“Relatedly, and perhaps more 
importantly, it is evident (particularly to members of the defense bar) that an antitrust 
agency seeking a merger remedy typically has considerable negotiating leverage given 
that it may be difficult and costly for the defendants to fight the agency in court; 
indeed; the merger may not survive long enough to permit a court fight.”). 
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much greater pressure to settle a matter when the transaction 
is being challenged by the FTC.  
2. The FTC Has More Freedom to Challenge Marginal 
Cases  
Commentators were surprised by the FTC’s persistence 
in its battle with Whole Foods.199 The settlement between the 
FTC and Whole Foods confirmed their suspicions that the case 
against Whole Foods was marginal at best. Despite what 
appears to be a significant divestiture of the Wild Oats assets, 
the settlement demonstrates the difficulties the FTC faces in 
fashioning effective post-closing relief. Not only is the burden 
on the parties and the divergence between the agencies 
particularly acute when the FTC pursues administrative 
litigation post-consumption, but the post-closing relief that it 
attains is not even necessarily in the public’s interest. As seen 
in the Whole Foods consent agreement, post-closing relief often 
does not fully resolve the anticompetitive harm or restore 
competition, thus wasting time and resources, as well as 
potentially harming consumers when parties pass on the costs 
to them.  
First, the settlement does not resolve the 
anticompetitive harms. After the merger closed, Whole Foods 
began integrating Wild Oats by rebranding Wild Oats stores, 
closing certain Wild Oats locations, and terminating certain 
leases.200 With this amount of “scrambling,” it becomes very 
difficult to “unscramble the eggs” and restore the acquired firm 
to its former status as a competitively viable company.201 As a 
result, the terms of the consent agreement are certainly much 
less vigorous than what the FTC would have sought before the 
  
 199 The influential Wall Street Journal denounced the FTC’s persistence in 
challenging the merger as antitrust double jeopardy and a “rigged game” in an 
editorial. Editorial, Whole Foods Fiasco, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2008, at A8. According to 
the Journal,  
[t]he Whole Foods fiasco is an embarrassment for the Bush Administration’s 
antitrust policy. This month, eight Senators on the Judiciary Committee 
sounded a note of caution about the FTC’s actions, and no less than 
Democratic antitrust scourge John Conyers has said he would like to hold 
hearings on abolishing the FTC’s administrative proceedings. When antitrust 
enforcement becomes a law unto itself, it’s time for some organic changes for 
regulators.  
Id.  
 200 FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
 201 Sher, supra note 18, at 52-53. 
2010] UNSCRAMBLING THE ORGANIC EGGS 965 
consumption of the merger.202 For example, the thirty two stores 
that Whole Foods is to divest will only provide relief in 
seventeen of the twenty nine geographic markets where the 
FTC alleged the merger would cause competitive harm.203 Over 
this two-year period, Whole Foods spent at least $16.5 million 
defending the merger.204 The FTC declined to say how much it 
spent but it was no doubt quite a substantial amount of 
taxpayer’s money.205 Despite all this time and resources, the 
only relief for the twelve other affected geographic markets is 
the mere divestiture of the Wild Oats name.  
Second, it is doubtful that the settlement will restore 
competition. Although the FTC hopes that reestablishing a 
PNOS competition under the Wild Oats name will restore the 
competition that was eliminated by the acquisition, and 
provide a “springboard for broader competition nationwide,” it 
is unclear when this future competition will occur, if it occurs 
at all.206 The two separate organic grocers before the merger, 
and the combined entity since the merger has forced its 
competitors—much larger supermarket chains with thousands 
of more stores—to adopt a similar strategy of offering organic 
natural foods and better customer services.207 When the merger 
was first announced, many analysts hailed the move as a 
  
 202 Analysis of Agreement, supra note 160, at 5 (“The absence of pre-
consummation relief from the district court, and Whole Foods’ subsequent integration 
activities, have made it more difficult for the Commission to obtain complete relief in 
this matter.”). 
 203 Id. at 3.  
 204 Andrew Martin, Wait. Why Is the F.T.C. After Whole Foods?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 14, 2008, at BU8.  
 205 Id.  
 206 Analysis of Agreement, supra note 160, at 5.  
 207 See David Kesmodel, Supervalu to Launch Organic-Foods Line, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 9, 2008, at B2. For example, Supervalu Inc., the third largest U.S. food retailer 
by sales, recently announced a line of organic and natural foods to compete with its 
rivals like Whole Foods and Trader Joe’s, and also to meet consumer demand. Id. “The 
company trails other conventional grocers in launching an organics line, but its 
selection will be among the largest. Safeway Inc. has had success with its O Organics 
brand, begun in late 2005, while Kroger last August introduced an expanded array of 
organic products under its Private Selection label.” Id. The successes of the other 
supermarkets are reflected in the decline of Whole Foods’. As Andrew Martin writes: 
It was not too long ago that Whole Foods, based in Austin, Tex., was a darling 
of Wall Street and routinely registered double-digit growth in comparable 
store sales, a common industry measure of the health of stores. But the 
company has been battered by competition from traditional grocery stores 
that have expanded their offerings of organic and natural foods.  
Andrew Martin, Private Equity Firm Buys 17% of Whole Foods, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 
2008 at B12.  
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sensible deal and necessary if both firms wanted to continue 
growing as they tried to fend off much larger supermarkets.208 
However, due to intense competition from other supermarkets, 
the general economic condition over the last few years, and the 
ensuing decrease in consumer spending, little has gone right 
for Whole Foods since 2007.209 Fortunately, amid a stabilizing 
economy, recent earnings data suggest the company is on the 
road to recovery.210 
As supermarket chains continue to enter this lucrative 
market, consumers have benefitted from the increased number 
of competitors.211 It is difficult to see how consumers will benefit 
from a reconstituted Wild Oats or a weakened Whole Foods, 
and even more difficult to see who would buy the Wild Oats 
name. A reconstituted Wild Oats will be a greatly weakened 
firm, facing off against a greater number of competitors than 
before the merger. Whatever the benefits of the divestiture, it 
is outweighed by the time and resources the FTC has put into 
this matter. It is difficult to believe that a divestiture of 
thirteen operating stores and the Wild Oats name is a victory 
for the FTC after a two year legal battle. 
Before the Whole Foods decision, it was debatable if the 
different legal preliminary injunction standards would produce 
different results.212 But as Whole Foods made clear, whether a 
proposed transaction may proceed does depend on which 
  
 208 One analyst compared the merger “to two knights who decide to stop 
fighting each other so they can protect the castle against bigger competitors.” Martin, 
supra note 1. 
 209 See David Kesmodel, Corporate News: Whole Foods Gets Infusion, Posts 
Steep Drop in Net, WALL ST. J, Nov. 6, 2008, at B2 (“[Whole Foods] has been hit hard 
by the weak economy as consumers cut back on discretionary spending and buy more 
store brands and discounted groceries.”); Timothy W. Martin, Corporate News: Whole 
Foods to Sell 31 Stores in FTC Deal, WALL ST. J, March 7, 2009, at B5 (“A lot has 
changed since 2007, when the FTC said the merger would ‘mean higher prices, reduced 
quality and fewer choices for consumers.’ In the past year, Whole Foods has seen its 
profits battered by the economic recession and stiffer competition from traditional food 
retailers like Safeway Inc. and Supervalu Inc.”).  
 210 See Paul Sonne & Timothy W. Martin, Whole Foods Profit Jumps as 
Turnaround Takes Root, WALL ST. J, Feb. 17, 2010, at B5. “The Austin, Texas-based 
grocery chain reported profit of $49.7 million, or 32 cents a share, compared with $27.8 
million, or 20 cents a share [in 2009]. Same-store sales, a key measure of retail health, 
rose 2.5%. Total sales for the quarter ended Jan. 17 climbed 7% to $2.6 billion from 
$2.47 billion.” Id. Whole Foods attributed the gains to a retooled strategy of lower 
prices and smaller stores to gain customers back. Id.  
 211 See Editorial, supra note 199 (“The market for natural and organic produce 
has exploded, with every discount outlet from Wal-Mart to Wegmans now offering 
organic products.”).  
 212 See supra note 172; see also ABA Comments re Differential Standards, 
supra note 14, at 4. 
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agency is reviewing the transaction. Unlike the FTC, the DOJ 
enjoys no presumption in favor of preliminary injunctive 
relief.213 If the DOJ fails to obtain a preliminary injunction, and 
any appeals (very unlikely) are exhausted, the parties are free 
to consummate their transaction. If the DOJ was the 
investigating agency in Whole Foods, Whole Foods would have 
been free to consummate the merger after its victory at the 
district court level. Unlike the FTC, the DOJ lacks the power to 
prolong challenged mergers until the parties settle. The effect 
of this divergence between the agencies is inconsistency and 
unpredictability in the marketplace. After Whole Foods, it is 
clear that the best possible outcome for parties seeking to 
merge would be for the proposed transaction to be cleared for 
review by the DOJ. The perception that the choice of 
investigating agency is outcome-determinative is no longer just 
perception. It is a fact. 
IV. SOLUTION: MINIMIZING THE DIVERGENCES 
In a dual enforcement system, it should not matter 
which agency is challenging the merger. The merging parties 
should “receive comparable treatment and face similar burdens 
regardless of whether the FTC or the DOJ reviews their 
merger.”214 Divergences between the FTC and the DOJ 
undermine consistency, predictability, efficiency, and fairness 
in the merger review process.215 More importantly, such 
divergences make it clear that the ultimate decision as to 
whether a transaction may proceed depends on which agency is 
reviewing the transaction.216  
This Note discusses two approaches to harmonizing the 
divergences between the FTC and the DOJ. The first approach 
is a judicial solution: to limit the expansive language in Whole 
Foods. The second approach is a legislative approach, 
specifically for Congress to amend the FTC Act to specify that 
the FTC is subject to the same standard for the grant of a 
preliminary injunction as the DOJ.  
  
 213 See FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2008).  
 214 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 138.  
 215 See id. at 138-39. 
 216 See id.  
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A. Judicial Solution 
The most significant difference between the July and 
November rulings in Whole Foods was that Judge Tatel no 
longer concurred in Judge Brown’s opinion but only in the 
judgment of the court.217 As a result of Judge Tatel’s revision, 
Judge Brown’s opinion was no longer the majority opinion of 
the court, and there were questions about the precedential 
value of the decision.218 However, any hope that the D.C. Circuit 
would limit the expansive language found in Whole Foods was 
dashed in FTC v. CCC Holdings, Inc.,219 where the preliminary 
injunction standard articulated in Whole Foods helped the FTC 
obtain their first preliminary injunction from a federal district 
court in nearly seven years.220 On March 18, 2009, less than a 
week after Whole Foods settled with the FTC, Judge Collyer 
issued a preliminary injunction that stopped the proposed 
merger between CCC Holdings and Mitchell International.221 
The FTC had argued that the merger of CCC Holdings and 
Mitchell International would reduce the number of competitors 
in the relevant market from three to two.222 In enjoining the 
CCC Holdings merger, Judge Collyer adopted Judge Brown’s 
diluted preliminary injunction standard articulated in Whole 
Foods.223 As a result, Judge Collyer granted the injunction 
because the FTC had “raised questions going to the merits so 
serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful as to make them fair 
ground for thorough investigation, study, deliberation and 
determination by the FTC.”224 Rather than risking an 
administrative trial, CCC Holdings and Mitchell International 
abandoned their transaction on March 11, 2009.225  
  
 217 Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1028. 
 218 See id. at 1061 n.8 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). According to Judge 
Kavanaugh, “this confused decision will invite years of uncertainty and litigation over 
what the holding of this case is-a separate but important problem with the Court’s 
approach.” Id.  
 219 605 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2009).  
 220 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Competition Acting Director David 
Wales to Leave FTC, (April 1, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/ 
04/dwales.shtm.  
 221 CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 30.  
 222 Id.  
 223 Id. at 35-36. 
 224 Id. at 30 (citing Heinz, 246 F.3d at 714-15; Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1035 
(Brown, J.); id. at 1042 (Tatel, J., concurring)).  
 225 See Press Release, CCC Information Services Inc., supra note 9. 
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CCC Holdings, Inc. made it clear that Judge Brown’s 
opinion was now binding precedent.226 The FTC read the case in 
the same way. In a speech about the FTC’s relationship to the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches, FTC 
Commissioner Thomas Rosch stated that: 
The CCC case confirms that Whole Foods established a new 
standard for FTC preliminary injunctions—at least for the D.C. 
Circuit. It is also clear, based on the express language in both the 
Whole Foods and CCC opinions, that this new standard will allow 
the FTC to more readily obtain a preliminary injunction from a 
federal district court. We are unlikely to see decisions like Arch Coal 
again in the D.C. District Court, where the FTC brings most of its 
merger enforcement actions and which is required to apply the law 
of the D.C. Circuit. Of course, there are 11 other regional circuit 
courts for which Whole Foods is not binding authority, but I expect 
that these courts will adopt the D.C. Circuit’s 13(b) standard as the 
opportunity arises.227 
After CCC Holdings, it appears that the best approach to 
harmonizing the divergences between the DOJ and the FTC 
would have to be a legislative approach.  
B. Legislative Solution 
The Antitrust Modernization Commission was created 
to undertake “a comprehensive review of U.S. antitrust law to 
determine whether it should be modernized.”228 It delivered its 
final report in 2007.229 One area of antitrust law the 
Commission reviewed and recommended improvements for was 
the enforcement process. The Commission recognized that 
there was “a perception, if not a reality, that the FTC and the 
DOJ face different standards for obtaining a preliminary 
injunction,” and called for Congress to remedy the growing 
  
 226 See CCC Holdings, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 36. According to Judge Collyer, 
“precedents irrefutably teach that in this context ‘likelihood of success on the merits’ 
has a less substantial meaning than in other preliminary injunction cases. Heinz not 
only emphasized this point but Whole Foods makes clear that Heinz remains good law.” 
Id. at 36 n.11.  
 227 J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Thoughts on the 
FTC’s Relationship (Constitutional and Otherwise) to the Legislative, Executive, and 
Judicial Branches, Remarks before the Berlin Forum for EU-US Legal-Economics 
Affairs, at 20-21 (Sept. 19, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/ 
090919roschberlinspeech.pdf.  
 228 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at i.  
 229 Id. 
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divergences between the DOJ and the FTC.230 The Commission 
made three recommendations in this regard: 
24. The Federal Trade Commission should adopt a policy that when 
it seeks injunctive relief in Hart-Scott-Rodino Act merger cases in 
federal court, it will seek both preliminary and permanent injunctive 
relief, and will seek to consolidate those proceedings so long as it is 
able to reach agreement on an appropriate scheduling order with the 
merging parties. 
25. Congress should amend Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act to prohibit the Federal Trade Commission from 
pursuing administrative litigation in Hart-Scott-Rodino Act merger 
cases. 
26. Congress should ensure that the same standard for the grant of 
a preliminary injunction applies to both the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice 
by amending Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act to 
specify that, when the Federal Trade Commission seeks a 
preliminary injunction in a Hart-Scott-Rodino Act merger case, the 
Federal Trade Commission is subject to the same standard for the 
grant of a preliminary injunction as the Antitrust Division of the 
Department of Justice.231 
The Commission believed these recommendations would 
eliminate the divergences between the DOJ and the FTC. If the 
FTC seeks both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in 
the same proceeding, this practice would be consistent with the 
DOJ’s current approach, and would eliminate the difference in 
burden of proof for the two agencies.232 To avoid the appearance 
of inconsistency, unpredictability, and unfairness in the merger 
review process, the Commission recommended the elimination 
of the FTC’s ability to commence administrative litigation in 
HSR Act merger cases.233 The Commission believed that the 
elimination of administrative litigation would provide the FTC 
with further incentive to seek permanent relief in a district 
court, and not in an administrative trial.234 Finally, to ensure 
  
 230 Id. at 141. 
 231 Id. at 139-41. 
 232 Id. at 139. Since the DOJ seeks both preliminary and permanent 
injunctions in the same proceeding, it has to prove the proposed transaction “would 
violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act by a preponderance of the evidence.” In contrast, 
the FTC only seeks a preliminary injunction so its burden required for obtaining a 
preliminary injunction is lower. Id. 
 233 See id. at 140.  
 234 Id. at 141. The Commission noted that the elimination of administrative 
trials would only apply in HSR Act merger cases, and would not affect the FTC’s ability 
to commence administrative trials for consummated mergers. “The proposed statutory 
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that courts apply the same preliminary injunction standard for 
both enforcement agencies, the Commission recommended that 
Congress amend the FTC Act to remove any standard for 
granting a preliminary injunction in HSR cases.235 The 
Commission believed that the elimination of the “public 
interest” language would lead courts to apply the traditional 
equity test used for the DOJ.236  
While the Commission’s recommendations will likely 
play a large role in the implementation of any legislative 
solution, it appears the recommendation with the best chance 
for success would be for Congress to amend Section 13(b) of the 
FTC Act to specify that the DOJ and the FTC is subject to the 
same preliminary injunction standard. The Commission’s other 
two recommendations, eliminating administrative proceedings 
in HSR Act merger cases and requiring the FTC to seek both 
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in the same 
proceedings, are likely to engender significant opposition from 
the FTC and the Obama administration. During his 
presidential campaign, President Obama made it clear that he 
would direct his administration “to reinvigorate antitrust 
enforcement” and “step up review of merger activity and take 
effective action to stop or restructure those mergers that are 
likely to harm consumer welfare, while quickly clearing those 
that do not.”237 It is unlikely that the Obama administration, 
which has signaled its support for vigorous antitrust 
enforcement, would weaken the FTC’s antitrust enforcement 
ability by eliminating its administrative litigation authority.238 
Any such efforts to require the FTC to emulate the DOJ’s 
current practice would be politically very difficult. Thus, the 
recommendation with the best chance of success is to amend 
  
bar would not preclude the FTC from pursuing an administrative complaint after the 
consummation of a merger, based on evidence that the merger has had actual, as 
opposed to predicted, anticompetitive effects.” Id.  
 235 Id. at 141-42.  
 236 Id. at 142.  
 237 Senator Barack Obama, Statement of Senator Barack Obama for the American 
Antitrust Institute (2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/ 
files/aai-%20Presidential%20campaign%20-%20Obama%209-07_092720071759.pdf. 
 238 See Justin Blum, Intel Case May Signal Increased Antitrust Enforcement, 
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001& 
sid=a4BNq.ad67N0; Stephen Labaton, Administration Plans to Strengthen Antitrust 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2009, at A1; Elizabeth Williamson & Matthew 
Karnitschnig, U.S. Signals More Scrutiny of Mergers, Antitrust, WALL ST. J., May 12, 
2009, at B1.  
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the FTC Act to specify that the FTC be subject to the same 
standard for the grant of a preliminary injunction as the DOJ.  
CONCLUSION 
To be effective, an enforcement system “must be clear, 
fairly administered, and not unreasonably burdensome.”239 
After Whole Foods, our dual antitrust enforcement system is 
anything but that. There has been a running debate as to 
whether the FTC and the DOJ face different standards for 
obtaining a preliminary injunction, namely that the FTC 
enjoys a lower preliminary injunction standard than the DOJ.240 
The D.C. Circuit Court’s opinion in Whole Foods puts that 
debate to rest in the D.C. Circuit with an empathetic “yes.”241 
The FTC’s ability to commence administrative litigation,242 
coupled with Whole Foods’ articulation of the preliminary 
injunction standard for the FTC,243 create divergences between 
the DOJ and the FTC. In a dual enforcement system, such 
divergences undermine consistency, predictability, efficiency, 
and fairness in the merger review process. More importantly, 
such divergences make it clear that the ultimate decision as to 
whether a transaction may proceed depends on which agency is 
reviewing the transaction.  
After Whole Foods, the arbitrary allocation of a 
proposed transaction to either the FTC or the DOJ for review 
can result in a very different substantive outcome for the 
transaction. In a system of shared responsibility for 
enforcement of the federal antitrust laws, such an outcome is 
unacceptable. In such a system, merging parties should expect 
comparable treatment and burden, as well as a comparable 
outcome.244 Since a judicial solution is unlikely,245 and any 
attempt to eliminate the FTC’s administrative litigation 
authority is politically difficult,246 the most politically promising 
solution to stem the growing divergence between the DOJ and 
the FTC is for Congress to amend the FTC Act to specify that 
the same preliminary injunction standard applies to both 
  
 239 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at iv.  
 240 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.  
 241 See supra Part III.A.  
 242 See supra Part I.A.3. 
 243 See supra Part III.A. 
 244 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION REPORT, supra note 13, at 131. 
 245 See supra Part IV.A. 
 246 See supra Part IV.B. 
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enforcement agencies. By doing so, Congress will ensure that 
the costs of merger review do not overwhelm the benefits of a 
fair and effective antitrust enforcement system. 
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